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LICENSE TO PROFIT: AN ANALYSIS OF
ENTRY REGULATIONS IN THE LEGAL AND
REAL ESTATE PROFESSIONS
EVGENY S. VOROTNIKOV'
1. INTRODUCTION
What do fortune tellers, florists, barbers, real estate agents, lawyers and
nuclear engineers have in common? All these professionals must obtain
licenses in order to perform their work legally in the United States. The
generally stated goal and main justification for this particular entry
regulation is to ensure quality of goods or services provided to the public by
eliminating dishonest practitioners and charlatans from the market. A
reasonable person would agree that it is necessary to control proficiency of
nuclear engineers because their mistakes could result in disasters leading to
tremendous negative consequences for the population and the environment.
Also, the reasonable person would agree that fortune tellers', florists' or
barbers' mistakes, in a worst case scenario, could ruin a customer's mood
and potentially cause some insignificant money loss. After comparing basic
potential consequences of nuclear engineers', fortune tellers', florists' and
barbers' mistakes, the reasonable person would probably wonder whether
licensing requirements should be similar for these professions. An expert
researcher would inquire further and would be interested in studying
whether licensure, in fact, improves the quality of services or restricts
competition in the professions and increases practitioners' incomes.
The goal of this work is, first, to choose two professions, one where a
professional's, mistake could cause significant and irreversible damages,
and another where that is not entirely the case. The second step is to study
the development of entry regulations in each of these professions. The final
step is to investigate whether these regulations arejustifiable, and whether
the ultimate beneficiary of those is the professional himself, or the
customer. The legal profession was chosen for its impact on society.
1. Ph.D. Candidate, Suffolk University, Department of Economics, 8 Ashburton P., Boston,
MA 02108, (617) 573-8023, evvmail@gmail.com. I thank Dr. Benjamin Powell and Aleksandra
V. Nikitenko for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
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Lawyers' mistakes may cause damages that have high cost in monetary
terms and irreversible impacts in terms of broken lives. The real estate
profession was selected because mistakes of these professionals are not as
immaterial as is the case with florists, fortune tellers and barbers, yet at the
same time not as costly or irreversible as it is the case with lawyers.
The subsequent section reviews the history of entry regulations
development and their current state in both professions. Section 3 explains
the real estate agents' and lawyers' work specifics. Section 4 contains the
main contribution and studies whether mandatory licensing is justified in
each of the professions. It further explores the consequences of the strict
entry regulations. The final section concludes.
2. HISTORY
2.1 Development of Entry Regulations in the Legal Profession
The development of entry regulations in the legal profession began with
local courts during the colonial period.2 Apprenticeships were a common
entry requirement and could last as long as 11 years.3 The requirements
were raised and tightened over the years with some states requiring college
education in addition to apprenticeships.4 Nonetheless, even in these states
the control was weak.' Despite the low entry barriers, each state policed the
compliance of practitioners with them.6 During the Jacksonian era, entry
requirements into the profession were eased or abolished in several states
and territories.7 A number of states nevertheless administered some type of
bar examination.8
Entry barriers came back after the Civil War.9 This rise coincided with
the establishment or strengthening of local and state bar associations as well
as the creation of the American Bar Association (ABA) in 1878." "Concern
for improving the competence of those entering the profession was a major
reason for creating the American Bar Association.... The Association
remains vitally and actively interested in improving the legal profession
2. Randall T. Shepard, On Licensing Lawyers: Why Uniformity is Good and Nationalization
is Bad, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 453, 454 (2004) (discussing the early history of the
American legal practice requirements).
3. Id.
4. Daniel R. Hansen, Do We Need the Bar Examination? A Critical Evaluation of the
Justifications for the Bar Examination and Proposed Alternatives, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1191,
1194 (1995) (discussing the early history of the American legal practice requirements).
5. Id. atl193 1194.
6. Shepard, supra note 2, at 454.
7. RICHARD L. ABEL, AM. LAWYERS 40 (1989).
8. Shepard, supra note 2, at 454.
9. ABEL supra note 7, at 41.
10. History of the Am. Bar Ass'n, http://www.americanbar.org/utility/about the-aba/
history.htmi; http://www.abanet.org/about/history.html.
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through legal education."" In 1879, fifteen of the thirty-eight states required
formal education and seven required three years of apprenticeship to
practice law. 2 Between 1889 and 1914, most states adopted some form of
written examination. 3 Furthermore, "apprenticeship virtually vanished as a
mode of entry.""' The stricter regulations did not deter people from entering
the profession, and the number of law students increased by more than four
times during that time period.'5
The proliferation of lawyers in the United States spurred further
tightening of entry regulations into this profession. 6 Initially, pre-legal
education requirements were increased. 7 In 1896, only 7 out of 76 law
schools required a high school diploma, but by 1903 this proportion
increased to 51 out of 104 schools. 8 Further increases in entry regulations
appeared in 1908 when law schools started to require two years of college
education (seven law schools in 1908)."9 The ABA supported this
requirement in 1918, and it spread rapidly among law schools. 20 By 1927
only 66 schools of 166 did not enforce this prerequisite.2 The college
education requirement was effective in deterring people from law schools.
The enrollment almost halved at the University of Wisconsin Law School
and Cornell University after the requirement adoption, and it more than
halved at the University of Minnesota and Yale.22 According to the Review
of Legal education, by 1948 practically all states adopted the two years of
pre-legal education prerequisite.23 Even though the state bar associations
played an important role in tightening entry restrictions, Abel sees the ABA
as a main lobbyist for the new entry requirements.2"
In 1948, the first Law School Admission Test (LSAT) was
administered by the Law School Admission Council (LSAC), founded a
year earlier. 25 The LSAC designed the LSAT to measure the strength of
11. 2010-2011 ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legaled/standards/2010-
2011 _standards/2010-2011 abastandards_pdf files/preamble.authcheckdam.pdf.
12. ABEL, supra note 7, at 41.
13. Elizabeth Chambliss, Professional Responsibility: Lawyers, A Case Study, 69 FORDHAM
L. REV. 817, 833 (2000).
14. ABEL, supra note 7, at 41.
15. Id.
16. Id. at43.
17. Id. at48.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. ABEL, supra note 7, at 48.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 49.
23. ABEL, supra note 7, at 46-47.
24. Id.
25. Lynda M. Reese & Ruth Anne Cotter, A Compendium of LSAT and LSAC-Sponsored
Item Types 1948-1994: Law School Admission Council Research Report 94-01, at 1, LSAC
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candidates' skills in the areas that are important for success in law school. 26
The LSAT also helped to assist law schools with their search for
candidates.2" The LSAT was a full-day test that initially consisted of ten
sections.28 Over the years, it has changed several times with the current
form being valid since 1991.29 Today, it is a half-day, six-section test,
administered by LSAC four times a year, and all ABA-approved law
schools require students to sit for this test.30
In 1952, the U.S. Department of Education acknowledged the ABA as
the national agency for law school accreditation.3' However, prior to that,
the ABA already established its minimum standards for the first time and
started to evaluate law schools in 1921-1922.32 Presently, there are three
types of law schools in the United States: ABA-accredited,33 state-
accredited, and non-accredited.34 The ABA explains the need for
accreditation by stating that "[l]aw schools that are ABA-approved provide
a legal education that meets a minimum set of standards promulgated by the
[ABA]."3 5 Since 1921, the enrollment in non-ABA-approved schools has
been constantly declining.36 In 1927, 67 percent of the students were
enrolled in unapproved schools.37 This number fell to nine percent in 1964
and to one percent by 1982,38 and there were few students that graduated
from state-accredited and non-accredited schools during the 1997-2008
period.39 The number of non-ABA-approved institutions declined as well.4"
Researchers and academics have been concerned with many requirements
that law schools must meet in order to qualify for accreditation. The ABA
RESEARCH REPORT SERIES (Apr. 1994), http://www.lsac.org/LSACResources/ Research/RR/RR-
94-01 .pdf.
26. LSAC-About the LSAT, http://www.lsac.org/JD/LSAT/about-the-LSAT.asp (last
visited Apr. 12, 2011).
27. Id.
28. Reese & Cotter supra note 25, at 1.
29. Id. at 7.
30. LSAC-About the LSAT, supra note 6.
31. 2010-2011 ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools.
32. ABEL supra note 7, at 54.
33. Currently, there are 200 ABA-accredited law schools, and these schools must go through
the accreditation process every seven years.
34. Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements 2010, at 10, Nat'l Conference of
Bar Examiners, NCBEX.ORG, available at http://www.ncbex.org/comprehensive-guide-to-bar-
admissions/.
35. Frequently Asked Questions, Approval of Law Schools: What is ABA approval of law
schools?, Am. Bar Assn., ABANET.ORG, available at http://www.abanet.org/
legaled/resources/faq.html.
36. ABEL supra note 7, at 277-79 (Table 21).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Bar Admission Statistics 1997-2009, Nat'l Conference of Bar Examiners, NCBEX.ORG,
available at http://www.ncbex.org/bar-admissions/stats/.
40. ABEL supra note 7, at 277-79 (Table 21).
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has been sued on these grounds.41 Massachusetts School of Law filed an
antitrust claim against the ABA alleging that "the ABA inflated faculty
salaries, reduced teaching loads, increased the cost of legal education, and
prevented disadvantaged persons from obtaining a legal education ... ABA
operat[ed] like a typical cartel, increasing price and decreasing output."4 2
The US Department of Justice further accused the ABA: "[t]he ABA's
process for accrediting law schools had been misused to inflate faculty
salaries and benefits. 43
The ABA accreditation affects law schools' ranking and recognition,
which makes the task of finding employment easier for graduates of those
institutions. In many states only students from the ABA-accredited
institutions are permitted to sit for the bar exam.' Additionally, it is more
complicated for graduates from state-accredited and non-accredited schools
to practice outside of the state they obtained their degrees.45 The majority of
the states waive bar exam requirements only for graduates from the ABA-
accredited law schools. 46 This process, referred to as Admission on Motion,
allows lawyers to practice in new states without retaking the bar exam once
they have a certain amount of work experience.47
The next wave of tightening entry regulations started in 1972 when the
National Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE), an affiliate of the ABA,
developed and administered the Multistate Bar Examination (MBE) for the
first time.48 With the exception of Louisiana, Washington, and Puerto Rico,
53 jurisdictions currently have the MBE as part of their respective bar
exams. 4' The MBE is a six-hour exam that is administered twice a year.
The goal of the MBE is to "determin[e] competence to practice." 50
In 1980, NCBE introduced the Multistate Professional Responsibility
Examination (MPRE).51 Since then, 52 U.S. jurisdictions have adopted this
41. Mike Magan, ABA Law School Accreditation Standards Anti-Competitive, DOJ Charges,
THE INDIANA LAWYER (July 12, 1995); Andy Portinga, ABA Accreditation of Law Schools: An
Antitrust Analysis, 29 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 635, 636 (1995).
42. Portinga, supra note 41, at 636; Massachusetts Sch. of Law v. American Bar Ass'n, No.
93-6206, at 1-2 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
43. Magan, supra note 41.
44. Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements, supra note 34, at 10.
45. See Mark Dykstra, Why Can't Johnny Sit for the Idaho Bar? The Unfair Effect of ABA
Accreditation Standards on State Bar Admission Requirements, 3 SAN DIEGO JUSTICE J. 285,
287-90 (1995) (providing further discussion of disadvantages that students from non-ABA
approved schools face).
46. Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements, supra note 34, at 25-28.
47. Id. at 25.
48. Nat'l Conference of Bar Examiners, Bar Admission Statistics 2009, at 30, NCBEX.ORG,
available at http://www.ncbex.org/bar-admissions/stats/.
49. Id. at 30.
50. Multistate Bar Examination (MBE), Nat'l Conference of Bar Examiners, NCBEX.ORG,
available at http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mbe/.
51. Although the M PRE was the first national legal ethics exam, "a survey of bar examiners
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exam52 as a prerequisite or co-requisite to taking the Bar examination. 3 The
MPRE is a two-hour exam that is administered three times a year.54 The
goal of the exam is "to measure the examinee's knowledge and
understanding of established standards related to a lawyer's professional
conduct."'55
Additionally, NCBE introduced the Multistate Essay Examination
(MEE) in 1988 and the Multistate Performance Test (MPT) in 1997.56
Currently, 23 and 34 jurisdictions, respectively, use them as a part of the
bar exam." In most of the jurisdictions, the MEE consists of six 30-minute
essay questions.58 The MPT is a three-hour exam that consists of two skills
questions.59 Both of the exams are conducted twice a year with the goal to
"determin[e] competence to practice."6
Some states, in addition to all of the aforementioned exams and test,
require new lawyers to attend basic skills and professionalism
orientations.6' Most of the states also require lawyers to attend eight to
fifteen hours of continuing legal education classes a year to maintain their
licenses in active status.62 These classes include one to three hours of ethics
education per year for the purpose of maintaining lawyers' proficiency and
ethics level after their initialadmission to the bar.63
in 1949 showed that legal ethics was tested on the bar in 35 of the 49 jurisdictions-more
frequently than such subjects as trusts, sales, taxation and administrative law." Paul Hayden,
Symposium: The Legal Profession: Looking Backward: Putting Ethics to the (National
Standardized) Test: Tracing the Origins of the MPRE, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1299, 1326 (2003).
52. Maryland, Puerto Rico, Washington, and Wisconsin are the jurisdictions that do not
require the MPRE and incorporate local ethics rules in their respective bar examinations.
53. Failing the MPRE exam postpones taking the Bar by six months which introduces
additional opportunity cost.
54. Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE), Nat'l Conference of Bar
Examiners, available at http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mpre/.
55. Description of the MPRE, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS,
http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mpre/mpre-faqs/descriptionO/. See also Evgeny S.
Vorotnikov, The Adverse Consequences of Entry Regulation in the Legal Profession, at 8 (under
review 2010, on file with author) (analyzing the MPRE requirement as one entry barrier to the
legal profession).
56. Bar Examination and Admission Statistics, 2009 Statistics, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR
EXAMINERS, 38-40, http://www.ncbex.org/bar-admissions/stats/.
57. Id. at 38-40.
58. Multistate Essay Examination (MEE), NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS,
http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mee/.
59. Multistate Performance Test (MPT), NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS,
http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mpt/.
60. Multistate Essay Examination (MEE), supra note 58; Id.
61. Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics of Self-
Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical Approach of the Canons, 83
N. C. L. REV. 411,480 n. 18 (2005).
62. Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements 2010, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
BAR EXAMINERS, at 43-44, http://www.ncbex.org/comprehensive-guide-to-bar-admissions/.
63. Id.
No. 2]
58 UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. V
Based on the historical facts, it is evident that occupational licensure in
the legal profession has been developing throughout the years introducing
entry barriers that have grown and tightened over these years.
2.2 Development of Entry Regulations in Real Estate Agent Profession
The development of occupational licensure in the real estate agent
profession began in 1870's and 1890's when American cities in their search
for new revenue sources started to tax the agents.64 Initially, these license
laws were non-regulatory, and everyone who could afford to pay necessary
fees was able to receive a real estate agent license.65 Local real estate boards
supported the existence of these fees, argued for the need to raise them, and
for the introduction of a bond requirement. Local boards saw fees and a
bond requirement as a way of cleaning the market from curbstoners.
However, evidence showed that license fees were not effective in
eliminating curbstoners from the market.66 This situation led state real estate
associations to propose a regulatory license law bill in California in 1907,
which was rejected.67
In the same year, Edward Judd proposed the formation of National
Association of Real Estate Exchanges that was subsequently founded in
1908,68 aiming "to unite the real estate men of America for the purpose of
effectively exerting a combined influence upon matters affecting real estate
interests."69 Later, in 1916, the name of the organization was changed to
The National Association of Real Estate Boards and, in 1972, to the
National Association of Realtors (NAR).7 ° Currently, the NAR is a well-
known donor to political campaigns with the biggest Political Action
Committee71 and "lobbies members of Congress and the administration on
virtually every issue facing business. 7 2
While state real estate boards played an important role in
professionalization of real estate agents, the NAR remained as the primary
engine. In formulating its code of ethics, the NAR followed the example of
the professions of medicine, law, and engineering. 73 The code was proposed
by the NAR at Winnipeg in 1913, and it covered the duty of real estate
64. PEARL JANET DAVIES, REAL ESTATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 104 (1958).
65. Id. at 105.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 106.
68 Field Guide to the History of the National Association of Realtors, NAT'L ASS'N OF
REALTORS, http://www.realtor.orglibrary/library/fg002.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. NAT'L ASS'N OF REALTORS, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000000062&cycle=2010.
73. DAVIES, supra note 64, at 101.
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professionals towards their clients and peers.7 4 Davies emphasized that the
choice that real estate agents faced at that time was to "[either] develop
themselves as a service group, with professional attitudes and qualification,
or to accept a role as middlemen-speculators when occasion offered,
brokers between times."75 Real estate agents chose the former way for their
development, and by 1915, a standardized code was approved or adopted by
35 local real estate boards.76
At the Winnipeg conference in 1913, the NAR also proposed to adopt
regulatory license laws in every state.77 After the Winnipeg conference,
there was a second attempt for a regulatory law in California, but it was&
vetoed." The third attempt was more successful, with licensing regulations
enacted and operated, but it was vetoed as unconstitutional several months
thereafter.79 Finally, in 1919, entry regulations were established in
California permanently. The same year Michigan also established entry
regulations. Not every real estate agent supported the establishment of
regulatory license laws. Some real estate professionals saw licensing as a
threat for the profession, and others claimed that licensing would be
inefficient in excluding charlatans.8" Although there was a controversy
among professionals, in 1922, the United States Supreme Court held that
real estate licensing laws were constitutional.8 By 1930, 24 states adopted
occupational licensure regulations,82 and by 1958 all states except New
Hampshire and Rhode Island adopted these regulations.83 Currently, all
states have some form of real estate licensing regulations.
One of the entry regulations consisted of a mandatory educational test
that every new real estate agent had to pass in order to demonstrate his
knowledge of real estate business. One of the places where agents could
obtain knowledge was educational courses that, for the first time, were
introduced by the West Side YMCA of New York in 1904.84 In 1905, the
University of Pennsylvania and the New York University School of
Commerce offered similar courses. By 1913, real estate courses were
available throughout the country.85 In 1913, the NAR became engaged in
promoting education and, in 1915, decided to develop a standard course that
all universities would use. However, this initiative was not met without
74. Id. at 98-99.
75. Id. at 99.
76. Id. at 101.
77. Id. at 90.
78. Id. at 106.
79. DAVIES, supra note 64, at 106.
80. Id. at 108.
81. Id. at 164.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 104.
84. Id. at 121.
85. DAVIES, supra note 64, at 121.
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opposition. 6 Only later, in 1923, a standard two-year course used by
universities was developed. In 1926, the University of Michigan started to
grant Masters Degrees in real estate business administration.87
After 1958, when almost all states adopted occupational licensure
regulations, the states started to raise educational and experience standards
for this profession.88 In 1978, the NAR Committee on Education and
License Law developed guidelines for the state real estate commissions,
where it proposed establishing continuing education requirement as a way
to increase the quality of service provided by the agents.89 By 1999, all
states except New Jersey adopted continuing education requirements,90 and
the real estate agents had to take continuing education classes every year, or
every other year, in order to renew their licenses.
Currently, candidates must complete state approved classes, a licensing
exam, and pay all necessary fees in order to obtain a real estate
salesperson's license. In 2010, the course requirements varied from 18
hours in Rhode Island to 210 hours in Texas.9 Colorado, North Carolina,
and Oregon do not have salesperson's licenses and require all candidates to
obtain a real estate broker's license, which generally is more complicated to
do.92 In the rest of the states, in order to get a broker's license, candidates
must attend 15 (in Alaska) to 630 additional hours of classes (in Texas) and
have up to five years (in Delaware) of work experience as salespersons. 93
Additionally, some states require real estate brokers to have surety bonds.
As evident from the historical overview, the licensing regulations in the
real estate profession have developed in the direction of raising those
standards, just as it has happened in the legal profession over the past two
centuries.
3. PROFESSIONAL SPECIFICS
3.1 Real Estate Agents
In order to be able to evaluate the possible damages from real estate
agents' mistakes and the need for strict entry regulations in this profession,
it is necessary to understand the kind of services agents usually provide to
86. Id. at 123.
87. Id. at 154.
88. The History of the Real Estate License Act,
http://www.trec.state.tx.us/formslawscontracts/rules-codes/rela.asp (demonstrating how licensing
requirements were tightened over time in Texas).
89. Benjamin Powell & Evgeny Vorotnikov, Real Estate Continuing Education: Rent
Seeking or Improvement in Service Quality?, E. ECON. J., at 1-2 (forthcoming 2011).
90. Id. at 2.
91. DIGEST OF REAL ESTATE LICENSE LAWS AND CURRENT ISSUES, 207-08 (2010).
92. Id.
93. Id
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their customers. The job of a real estate agent is to facilitate the sale or
purchase of a property.94 When selling a property, agents guide sellers
through the process, preparing the necessary paperwork, arranging the title
search and insurance through a title service company, marketing the
property either by using Multiple Listing Service or by other means, and
showing the property to prospective buyers.95 Additionally, agents provide
clients with information about the property location and the estimates for
comparables in the area.96 This provision of information differs from an
appraisal service, which real estate agents do not always provide because in
most states this activity requires holding an appraiser license.97 Agents also
help negotiate the price and oftentimes associate themselves with loan
officers who help take care of the financing issues for the potential buyer.98
At the closing stage, real estate agents ensure that all legally mandated
inspections take place, and that the parties meet all terms of the contract. 99
After performing these duties, the agent must arrange a closing day, where
buyers, sellers and their brokers meet, and an attorney reviews the contract
and closes the deal. 00
Overall, the real estate agents' responsibility is to ensure that buyers
and sellers meet each other, and to coordinate the work of other
professionals involved in closing a deal. Therefore, the cost of potential
damages caused by real estate agents could be significant, but not too high,
because most risks in a typical real estate transaction are carried by other
specialists. Moreover, most of the possible damages caused by realtors
could be estimated in monetary terms.
3.2 Lawyers
The legal system affects nearly every aspect of human lives, and
lawyers are the individuals who make the system work through actively
participating in its constant development. 01  Lawyers, when performing
their duties, act as advisors, advocates, negotiators, evaluators, and on
occasion, third-party neutrals. 0 2 The complexity of the legal system often
94. Careers in Real Estate, NAT'L ASS'N OF REALTORS, http://www.realtor.org/
realtororg.nsf/pages/careers/.
95. Why Use a Realtor?, NAT'L ASS'N OF REALTORS, http://www.realtor.com/
basics/allabout/realtors/why.asp.
96. Id.
97. Designations & Certifications, NAT'L ASS'N OF INDEPENDENT FEE APPRAISERS,
http://www.naifa.com/education/designations.cfm.
98. Careers in Real Estate, supra note 94; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos l20.htm#nature.
99. Careers in Real Estate, supra note 94; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 98.
100. Careers in Real Estate, supra note 94; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 98.
101. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 98.
102. Preamble, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR ASS'N, ABANET.ORG,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/preamble.html.
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causes lawyers to specialize in either criminal law or civil law. Moreover,
further specialization in each of these areas is also common." 3 Lawyers that
specialize in criminal law generally argue their cases in tribunals and work
with clients who face criminal convictions." ° Lawyers that specialize in
civil law assist clients with a wide range of matters, including, for instance,
litigation, wills, trusts, contracts, mortgages, titles, and leases." 5 No matter
what area a lawyer practices in, their mistakes could cause serious damages
to their clients. A single mistake in the contract could potentially lead to
multimillion dollar losses for a client. On the other hand, in some cases, it
may be impossible to reasonably estimate the costs of mistakes in monetary
terms and compensate clients accordingly. For instance, what would be an
appropriate compensation for the cost of several years wrongfully spent in
prison by a client? Moreover, sometimes the damages caused by lawyers'
mistakes are irreversible. Is it possible to reverse a wrongful death penalty
execution?
4. PRE-LEGAL REQUIREMENTS AND MANDATORY LICENSURE:
JUSTIFICATION AND CONSEQUENCES
A reason why the majority of researchers do not generally support
occupational licensing regulations is that these regulations are lobbied for
by professionals themselves or by affiliated lobby organizations.'0 6 Hence,
instead of protecting customers from incompetent professionals and poor
quality of service, these regulations simply reduce competition.'0 7 Because
it becomes more complicated to enter into a profession, the number of
professionals in the market remains stable or even decreases.0 8 As a result,
professionals can charge higher fees for their services, and there remain
fewer incentives for them to innovate or compete over quality. '09
The main justification for the existence of mandatory licensure, which
is the most restrictive form of occupational regulation, is that professionals
can cause damages that are hard to estimate in monetary terms in order to
properly compensate victims, or irreversible damages that are impossible to
compensate. In any other case, the population does not need an additional
protection by means of occupational licensure regulations because it is
already protected from fraud, professional negligence or other types of
damages by means of existing laws and a proper court system to enforce
those laws.
103. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 98.
104. Id.
105. Lawyers, 2010-11 Occupational Outlook Handbook, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos053.htm.
106. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 138-158 (1962).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Morris Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, 14(4) J. OF ECON. PERSP. 189, 192 (2000).
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By nature of their profession, real estate agents generally cannot cause
irreversible damages, and the presence of the mandatory licensure in this
profession could not be justified on this ground. Arguably, the majority of
damages that a real estate agent can cause could be estimated in monetary
terms. Customers are already protected by existing laws, and all damages
would be compensated according to these laws. On the other hand, lawyers
could cause irreversible damages. However, Benjamin Barton argued that
there is no need to regulate the whole legal market, and only a limited
subsection of the market should be regulated because only lawyers that are
engaged in criminal defense work could cause irremediable damages."° He
asserted that other types of lawyers cannot cause inestimable monetary
damages, and, as a result, customers have an option to be properly
compensated for lawyers' faux pas."'
Since the merits of mandatory licensure are questionable, it is necessary
to investigate whether strict pre-licensing regulations in both the legal and
the real estate professions benefit customers or practitioners. There are
several empirical studies that attempt to answer this question." 2 Carroll &
Gaston found that stricter regulations lowered the number of real estate
agents per capita and decreased service quality. On the other hand, Johnson
& Loucks and Shilling & Sirmans showed that stricter regulations reduced
the number of practicing real estate agents, but increased quality of service
as measured by the number of complaints filed against the agents." 3 In
Ethics and Lobbying: The Case of Real Estate Brokerage, Barker argued
that the presence of mixed conclusions regarding the effect of entry
regulations on quality of service is a consequence of "significant data
limitations" prominent in the above studies.'"' Barker showed that stricter
entry regulations decreased the number of agents in the market, thereby
increasing incomes of the remaining real estate professionals. According to
Barker's analysis, an extra year of experience required for a broker's license
increased the professional's annual income by $852. In addition, an extra
hour of continuing education resulted in a $235 addition to the real estate
agent's annual income. Lastly, Barker showed that with each additional
hour of pre-licensing coursework, annual income increased by $2.'
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Barker also investigated whether the quality of service, as measured by
the number of complaints filed, increased when entry regulations became
more restrictive. Based on his analysis, Barker did not find any
improvement in quality of service after the tightening of entry
regulations." 6 Powell & Vorotnikov was the most recent and the first study
to estimate the fixed cost of the mandatory continuing education for real
estate agent requirements."' Using Massachusetts data, they found that the
introduction of continuing education, lobbied vigorously by the NAR's
affiliate Massachusetts Association of Realtors (MAR), resulted in the
ousting of 39-58 percent of agents out of the real estate business." 8 They
also found that the average real wage of agents that remained in the market
increased by about 1 1-17 percent as a result of the continuing education
requirement." 9 Additionally, Powell & Vorotnikov analyzed the number of
complaints to the licensing board or complaints with a guilty verdict and
found no evidence of improved service quality. They concluded that these
results allowed them to interpret MAR's behavior as a case of "interest
group lobbying intended to increase their own incomes rather than a public
spirited attempt to improve service quality."'1
20
There were a number of empirical studies analyzing the legal
profession's licensing requirements in the similar manner as the real estate
profession. In their 1981 study, Getz, Seigfried & Calvani considered the
bar exam as the only licensing requirement and found no effect of bar
examination passage rates on lawyers' incomes. 121 Two decades thereafter,
Kleiner used a different approach. He analyzed the effect of licensing on the
legal profession through comparing lawyers' incomes with the incomes of
individuals in similar but unlicensed professions.122 Kleiner found that
lawyers' incomes were higher by about 10 percent. 23
Among analysts, there were two plausible explanations for higher
lawyers' incomes. 124 One was that stricter regulations forced lawyers to
improve the quality of service, which resulted in the demand increase for
these services and lawyers incomes. 25 Another view was that the higher
entry barriers to the profession weakened competition, which allowed
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License to Profit: An Analysis of Entry Regulations
practitioners to keep service fees high.126 Therefore, without studying the
effect of regulations on quality of service, it was impossible to conclude
whether stricter regulations benefited society or solely the practitioners
themselves. In 2005, Pagliero studied the effect of licensing regulation in
the legal profession on consumers' welfare and incomes of entry-level
attorneys. 27  He found that licensing solely benefitted the legal
professionals. 128  Specifically, he showed that the licensing board
manipulated bar exam passage rates, which, on average, increased
attorneys' annual incomes by $10,000 (in 2002 USD). 129 However, it is
worth noting that in his analysis, Pagliero considered the bar exam as the
only licensing requirement, and used the exam score as a proxy for
candidates' quality when arriving at his conclusions. 30
In 2010, Vorotnikov conducted a new empirical analysis of the
licensing within the legal profession using an array of the prominent
regulations to investigate the impact of those on professionals' income and
the quality of service provided.' 3' The study also used the number of
complaints filed against lawyers as a measure of quality, which is one of the
most common ways to measure the quality of service as described in the
occupational licensing literature. 3 2 The results demonstrated that service
quality fell and the average lawyers' income rose after the tightening of the
majority of licensing regulations.'33 Specifically, the study showed that "the
combined effect of a one standard deviation decrease in the MPRE and Bar
exam passage rates, and a one standard deviation increase in the CLE hour
requirement, on average, increased lawyers' incomes by $7,544 and
increased the number of complaints filed by 95 per one million
residents."' 34 The results of the analysis also illustrated that the introductory
education did not affect the incomes, and instead increases the number of
complaints in states that have it by 120 per one million state residents.'35
Lastly, the study found that the ethics education had no affect on lawyers'
incomes, and a one standard deviation increase in the requirement reduced
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the filed complaints by approximately 1 1 per one million residents. 3
6
The aforementioned studies for both the legal and the real estate
professions have revealed that the vast majority of the regulations resulted
in either no change in service quality or its deterioration. On the other hand,
historical facts demonstrate that the qualification requirements for licensure
in the legal and real estate professions have been raised and were tightened
over the past decades. Despite the difference in the caliber of costs and
types of damages that professional mistakes of those two groups could
cause currently, both of these professions endure the most restrictive form
of occupational regulation. This spur in licensing laws was not an accident.
Both professions have strong lobby groups that have been promoting the
establishment of entry regulations, and have been masking the promotion of
self-interests with concern about customers. In addition to demonstrating
deterioration or lack of change in quality of service for both professions,
empirical evidence showed proof that professional incomes in both
occupations increased with the introduction of new regulations. Therefore,
it is possible to conclude that occupational regulation in the legal and the
real estate professions was not designed to protect consumers, and instead,
was invented to promote the self-interests of the professionals.
4. CONCLUSION
The laws protecting consumers from fraud and misconduct were
designed a long time ago, and have been evolving for decades. A well-
functioning court system ensures that these laws are enforced, that the
professionals who take advantage of customers or cause them damage are
punished, and that victims are properly compensated. Recent research and
empirical analysis developments in the area of occupational licensing
provide strong evidence that occupational licensing regulations are abused
by private interest groups that strive to gain anticompetitive advantages for
themselves instead of benefitting the society, thereby interfering with free-
market and free competition in the economy. A re-examination of the state
of entry regulations in a number of prominent professions is long overdue,
the results of which will likely lead to a decision to abolish excessive and
ineffective entry regulations for most of the professions. If appropriate
measures are not taken, this society may find itself in a situation where
children that operate a lemonade stand will be required to acquire a license
from the government or some third-party interested organization.
Unfortunately, the United States is already in this situation.'37
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